Television got its crypto villain this week. The real losses preferred the tradesman’s entrance.

On Thursday Netflix released The Altruists, eight episodes about the fall of FTX, with Anthony Boyle and Julia Garner playing Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison.¹ It is a story with a centre: two people, one exchange, one hole in the accounts.

I will leave the reviews to others. This week’s post-mortems are a different genre, and they have no centre at all.

Last Sunday I wrote about spare keys: on paper, in logs, behind default passwords.² This week the money and the data left through the side of the building.

A courier’s database. A script on somebody’s website. A shelf in a Dubai shop. A logging tool that had already appeared in this column. A validator that joined the network the day before.

Nobody broke down the front door. Most of them did not need to find it.

The same logging tool, twice

Last week Proxima, a Solana trading app, said private keys had been written into debug logs held in a SigNoz instance, an open-source monitoring tool, with a known vulnerability and an upgrade that had been “repeatedly postponed”.³

On Sunday morning Fluidkey, a Swiss self-custodial wallet, published its post-mortem for 19 Nov. The tool was SigNoz again.⁴

Fluidkey says it was running version 0.121.1. The two flaws the attacker used had been fixed in versions 0.141.1 and 0.142.1, and SigNoz had published advisories for both.⁵ Through them, the attacker read Fluidkey’s internal logs for a week. The logs held users’ session tokens.

With those tokens, Fluidkey says, the attacker created transfers on its servers, marked them approved and raised spending limits. Then came the cleverest and nastiest step: tiny payments to make users’ phones show a notification. Users who opened the app had the waiting transfer signed for them.

About $1.6 million left 52 accounts, by Fluidkey’s count. Names, IBANs and addresses linked to 70 accounts were exposed.⁶

I want to be fair to SigNoz. Neither company says the current software was at fault. Both describe copies that had not been updated, and a log that held something it should never have held.

That is the point. A logging tool is meant to record what happened. In two post-mortems published eight days apart, it had recorded the keys to what happened next.

The wallet was self-custodial. The logs were not.

The courier, the script and the shelf

The other side doors were stranger, and in one case physical.

Trezor, which makes hardware wallets, said an attacker exported shipping data for about 27,000 orders from Skladon, its delivery partner: names, phone numbers, home addresses, email addresses, and what each customer bought and paid.⁷ Its own systems and devices were not affected, it says. Some customers have already had scam calls.

Trezor’s own warning asked customers to “be alert to potential risks to your physical security”.⁸ It is a remarkable sentence for a company whose product exists to keep you safe, and it is the right one. A list of people who own a hardware wallet, with their addresses, is not a list anyone should have to read twice.

Then the website. On 16 Nov an attacker wrote code into Optimizely customer projects, so that 178 organisations’ sites served a script that swapped crypto addresses, skimmed cards and attacked older iPhones, according to the security firm Report URI.⁹ Ledger’s site was one of them, alongside HSBC and the BBC. About $7,000 reached the attacker’s wallets.

Optimizely says it fixed a sign-up flaw and removed the code.¹⁰ Seven thousand dollars is small. The reach was not. A tool bought to test which button colour sells better ended up deciding, for a few hours, where some visitors’ crypto went.¹¹

Then the shelf. Two Ledger owners say hardware wallets they bought new at Virgin Megastore in Dubai were drained of about $604,000 between them.¹² A public registry kept by Mark Karpelès lists an implant in one device as confirmed and the second as suspected.¹³ Ledger said on X that its investigation was ongoing and that it had found no flaw in its chip or operating system.¹⁴

Nobody has shown where those devices were opened. I would only note the shape of the week.

A hardware wallet’s promise is that the secret never leaves the box. This week the box itself was the question.

The keys that were valid

The last side door was not a vulnerability in the usual sense. It was a membership.

Chainflip, a cross-chain swap protocol, says its attacker funded a wallet through Tornado Cash on 11 Nov, bought its FLIP token and registered a validator account on 20 Nov.¹⁵ On Saturday morning its Ethereum vault was emptied in one transaction carrying a signature from the protocol’s own aggregate key. Chainflip later said the attacker also took 122.86 BTC.¹⁶

By our arithmetic that is about $12 million. Chainflip says it has “identified the mechanism of key exposure”, and has offered a 10% bounty if the rest comes back by 18:38 UTC on Monday. At 10:46 UTC today the bitcoin had not moved, by our read of the blockchain.¹⁷

Lighter, a derivatives exchange, had a different kind of valid key. Its post-mortem says a trader’s API keys were calculated from public signatures because signing code outside Lighter’s official kits reused nonces, the one-time numbers a signature depends on.¹⁸ Bubblemaps counted about $10.4 million taken; Lighter’s Security Council returned about $5 million.¹⁹

Aster’s chief executive confirmed that a user lost assets after an API wallet key leaked.²⁰ The trader says it was $4.56 million, through seven transfers he never signed.

And Wagyu’s wrapped Monero, XMR1, fell from about $494 to $1 after the token’s issuer wallet sent 5.2 million XMR1 to a new address, which sold them. A Wagyu contributor later said the key had been on an old, deleted server at a hosting provider he says was hacked.²¹ Somebody else’s server, again.

Incident ledger

  • Chainflip · Ethereum vault and Bitcoin vault drained with a valid aggregate-key signature; about $12M by our arithmetic; 10% bounty open until 18:38 UTC Monday. Chainflip’s bounty.
  • Lighter · nonce reuse in unofficial signing code leaked a trader’s API keys; about $10.4M taken by Bubblemaps’ count, about $5M returned, Lighter says. Lighter’s post-mortem.
  • Aster · API wallet key leak confirmed by the CEO; the trader puts his loss at $4.56M; no investigation published. our alert.
  • K3 Capital sBOLD · vault emptied of about $3.42M in eight minutes; Bitquery says a copycat bot took 56%, most of it paid to block builders. our alert.
  • Fluidkey · outdated SigNoz copy exposed session tokens; about $1.6M from 52 accounts; data linked to 70 accounts. Fluidkey’s post-mortem.
  • Ledger devices, Dubai · two owners say about $604,000 drained from wallets bought at Virgin Megastore; one implant confirmed by a public registry; Ledger investigating. the Dubai wallets.
  • Wagyu XMR1 · issuer wallet moved 5.2M tokens and sold about $13.5M worth, CoinDesk reported; the token fell 99%; native Monero unaffected. our alert.
  • Cyber · unexpected CYBER mint on Solana, 5.21M CYBER released from the Ethereum lockbox; Upbit and Bithumb paused transfers. our alert.
  • Optimizely · script on 178 organisations’ sites, Ledger’s among them; about $7,000 to the attacker, Report URI says. the Optimizely script.
  • Trezor / Skladon · shipping data for about 27,000 orders exported; no funds taken; scam calls reported. Trezor’s courier breach.
  • LUKSO · attacker added controller keys to some Universal Profiles; no count or figure given. our alert.

Running total: not summed. Chainflip’s figure is our own arithmetic at the time of the theft, Aster’s and the Dubai figures are victims’ claims, Lighter’s is partly returned, XMR1’s $13.5M is what was sold rather than what holders lost, and three entries involve data or keys with no dollar figure. Adding them would give a number with more decimals than meaning.

Elsewhere

  • South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service told all 28 crypto firms to recheck the external access points of their systems against AI-assisted hacking: the FSS meeting.
  • Bitcoin Core patched a bug, found with the help of a large language model, that let a peer stall nodes. It gave no way to steal coins: the advisory.
  • A US task force opened a centre, run on TRM Labs’ platform, where exchanges and payment firms can freeze scam proceeds on shared tips: the Threat Disruption Center.
  • Coins.ph, one of the Philippines’ biggest apps, stopped transfers to and from self-custody wallets, citing the travel rule: Coins.ph’s change.
  • Not a hack: Kraken’s Canadian-dollar books let bitcoin trade as low as C$24,250 on Saturday, and Kraken says the trades stand: the Kraken CAD trades.

Close

FTX makes good television because there is somebody to look at. This week offers nobody to cast. The courier, the plug-in vendor, the shop and the logging tool each did one job for somebody else, and each became the way in.

The industry spends heavily on the front door: audits, bug bounties, cold storage. The week’s lesson is cheaper and more tedious.

Make a list of everyone who touches your customers, your website, your boxes and your logs. Then ask which of them you have never checked.

See you next Sunday. — L.C.

Footnotes

  1. Netflix released all eight episodes on 19 Nov, Variety reported. Variety notes that Bankman-Fried was sentenced to 25 years in prison after a federal jury convicted him on seven counts of fraud and conspiracy. I offer no view on the casting.
  2. The Spare Key Week, 15 Nov.
  3. Proxima’s post-mortem, 14 Nov; see Proxima’s post-mortem. It counted 5,324.2 SOL from 181 users and says it refunded them.
  4. Fluidkey’s post-mortem, published early on 22 Nov.
  5. One of SigNoz’s advisories is here; our report links both.
  6. Fluidkey’s counts. It says users’ private keys stayed on their devices, and that about 887 ETH went to a mixing service. See Fluidkey’s post-mortem.
  7. Trezor’s blog, 16 Nov. The orders date from 9 Aug to 7 Nov. No recovery phrases or PINs were involved; Trezor says neither it nor Skladon holds them.
  8. Same post. See Trezor’s courier breach.
  9. Report URI, 16 Nov, updated 17 Nov.
  10. Optimizely on X, 17 Nov. Ledger’s security team said keys remained protected by the device.
  11. Report URI’s own description of the injection route is more precise than mine; ours is in the Optimizely script.
  12. The owners’ accounts on X, as tallied by Cointelegraph. We have not verified the purchases.
  13. Karpelès’ PSA and the registry, 18 Nov.
  14. Ledger’s replies on X, 18 Nov, as described in the update to our report. Virgin Megastore has not commented publicly that we have found.
  15. Chainflip’s terms page and its post on X, 21 Nov.
  16. See our first alert for the Ethereum leg.
  17. The address is on mempool.space. “Had not moved” means no output spent as of that read.
  18. Lighter’s post-mortem on X, 16 Nov. A nonce is meant to be used once. Used twice, it lets anyone with the two signatures do the algebra.
  19. Bubblemaps’ count, as cited in our alert. Lighter says its own contracts were unaffected.
  20. Aster’s CEO on X, 17 Nov, in Chinese; our translation.
  21. The contributor’s posts on X, 20 Nov, as summarised in the update to our XMR1 alert. He also said market makers would be refunded in full. We have not been able to check either claim.

References

  • Fluidkey, Security incident of 19 November 2026, 22 Nov 2026. https://docs.fluidkey.com/security/incident-2026-11-19/
  • SigNoz, security advisory GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5. https://github.com/SigNoz/signoz/security/advisories/GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5
  • Trezor, Data breach at Trezor shipping partner Skladon, 16 Nov 2026. https://trezor.io/blog/news/data-breach-at-trezor-shipping-partner-skladon
  • Report URI, World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, 16 Nov 2026. https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
  • Optimizely on X, 17 Nov 2026. https://x.com/Optimizely/status/2122500375727194333
  • Mark Karpelès on X, 18 Nov 2026. https://x.com/MagicalTux/status/2122864094474862679
  • Ledger Implant OSINT registry. https://karpeleslab.github.io/ledger_implant_osint/
  • Chainflip Labs, Message from Chainflip Labs, 21 Nov 2026. https://chainflip.io/return
  • Lighter on X, Signing Safely on Lighter, 16 Nov 2026. https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122394446343946717
  • Aster CEO on X, 17 Nov 2026. https://x.com/Leonard_Aster/status/2122633027729944668
  • Bitquery, K3 Capital sBOLD hack, 18 Nov 2026. https://www.bitquery.io/investigations/k3-capital-sbold-hack
  • Variety, The Altruists release date, 13 Aug 2026. https://variety.com/2026/tv/news/netflix-the-altruists-release-date-first-look-photos-1236833976/

This article is for information only and is not investment advice.