UPDATED 21:38 UTC, 21 Nov: Chainflip said on Saturday evening that the attacker also took 122.86 BTC from its vaults, on top of the Ethereum funds in this report, which puts the total at about $12 million by our arithmetic. It has offered a 10% bounty if the other 90% is returned by 18:38 UTC on 23 November. Full details here.

UPDATED 14:55 UTC, 21 Nov: The money moved on within minutes. Our read of the Ethereum record shows the receiving address swapping the USDC and USDT for ether on Uniswap at 07:12 and 07:14 UTC, with the proceeds sent to a second address, 0xfd24197eF8503dd5dd18F30C7B86A77910D3B080. That address also received the 542.7 ETH left on the first one, then pushed 2,909 ETH into Tornado Cash, a mixing service, in three batched transactions between 07:18 and 07:19 UTC, about eight minutes after the drain. Security firms PeckShield and Lookonchain reported the same route. By 14:55 UTC Chainflip had not given a cause, a loss figure or a restart time; its 09:14 UTC post is still its only statement.

SECURITY ALERT

The vault needed the network’s signature to move.

It got one.

Chainflip, a protocol that swaps native coins between blockchains, has disabled deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quotes after its Ethereum vault was emptied of about $4.86 million in a single transaction at 07:10 UTC on Saturday, according to the transaction record and security monitor Defimon.

The transaction moved 520.2 ETH, about 3.25 million USDC and about 758,000 USDT to a newly created address, our read of the Ethereum record shows.

Chainflip said on X at 09:14 UTC that it is “aware of a potential exploit affecting Chainflip vaults” and that the protocol “is being put into full safe mode”. It has not given a loss figure or a cause.

So how did the money get out?

The timeline

At 07:10:59 UTC, in Ethereum block 26,461,896, a brand-new address sent a single transaction to the Chainflip Vault contract.

The vault held 520.2 ETH, 3,249,631 USDC and 758,141 USDT in the block before. In the block of the transaction, it held nothing.

At 07:33 UTC, Defimon Alerts flagged the drain and put the loss at about $4.86 million. Our own sum, with ether near $1,630 at the time, comes to the same figure.

At 09:14 UTC, roughly two hours after the transaction, Chainflip announced the safe mode.

By about 10:55 UTC the vault had received small new deposits, about 8.7 ETH and some $15,000 in stablecoins, by our read.

What made the transaction valid?

A signed withdrawal

Chainflip’s vaults release funds only when an instruction carries a signature from the network’s aggregate key, a key shared among its validators so that no single one of them holds it.

Defimon says the drain went through the vault’s batch-transfer function and that the signature checked out against the live aggregate key. It says this points to “a compromise of the validator network’s aggregate signing key rather than a signature-verification bug”.

That is Defimon’s reading. Chainflip has not confirmed how the transfer was authorised.

Blockchain-security firm AMLBot says the receiving wallet’s fees had been paid with ether that came through Tornado Cash, a mixing service, 60 seconds before. We have not traced that leg.

The addresses, as read on Ethereum:

Vault: 0xf5e10380213880111522dd0efd3dbb45b9f62bcc

Receiving address: 0x7d14a719072da80076b4edcec3e3401209d21eaf

Transaction: 0xc928950f79b4e4697af674310d1f3a08c2659adc4d60e719f3af90ab023ff20f

Is anything else at risk?

What we don’t know

Chainflip runs vaults on several chains. Its post refers to “Chainflip vaults” in the plural; Defimon’s alert covers only the Ethereum vault.

Chainflip’s FLIP token traded at about $0.287 at 10:53 UTC, down about 40% over 24 hours, according to CoinGecko.

Chainflip has also been one of the routes used to move ether from the Binance theft this week, according to on-chain trackers. Nothing published so far links the two.

The vault drain comes a day after Wagyu’s XMR1 collapse on Friday.

Protect yourself

  • Do not send funds to a Chainflip deposit address, or through a wallet’s swap feature that routes via Chainflip, until Chainflip says the protocol is out of safe mode.
  • If a swap was in progress, keep the transaction hash and wait for Chainflip’s own instructions on X.
  • Ignore direct messages offering refunds or “recovery”. A protocol’s keys protect everyone’s funds; read what a private key controls.

Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]

This article is for information only and is not investment advice.