SECURITY ALERT
The wallet was self-custodial.
The logs were not.
An attacker used two known flaws in an out-of-date copy of SigNoz, an open-source logging tool running on Fluidkey’s own servers, to read users’ session tokens and take about $1.6 million from 52 accounts on 19 Nov, according to Fluidkey’s post-mortem, published early on Sunday.
The Swiss privacy wallet says the logs also exposed personal details linked to 70 accounts, including 17 bank account numbers.
It says users’ private keys, the ones that actually move funds, stayed on their own devices throughout.
So how did money move without them?
How it worked, by Fluidkey’s account
Some of Fluidkey’s services had written users’ session tokens into those logs, the company says. A session token is what tells a server that a user is logged in.
With those tokens, the attacker created transfer requests on Fluidkey’s servers, marked them as approved and raised users’ two-factor spending limits.
A prepared transfer still needed the user’s device to sign it. So, Fluidkey says, the attacker sent tiny payments to make users’ phones show a notification.
Users who then opened and unlocked the app had the waiting transfer signed for them, “as it does for transfers the user has approved”, the report says.
The fault, in other words, was not in the key. It was in what the server was willing to call approved.
Why was the logging tool open at all?
The unpatched tool
Fluidkey ran SigNoz version 0.121.1. The two flaws the attacker used were fixed in versions 0.141.1 and 0.142.1, it says.
SigNoz’s own advisories describe them. The first let anyone who could reach the server query some analytics endpoints with no credentials. The second was a database injection flaw in the same feature.
Fluidkey says the attacker read its internal logs between 12 and 19 Nov, after probing the same endpoints from 5 Nov without getting any log content back.
That is a week of reading before the first transfer.
Where did the money go?
The money and the data
The stolen funds were spread across Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Arbitrum, the report says. Most were swapped into ETH, and about 887 ETH was sent to a mixing service that Thursday evening.
Fluidkey says it traced the funds with SEAL 911, a volunteer emergency response group, and has hired zeroShadow, a blockchain investigations firm.
It has reported the theft to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center and to Switzerland’s National Cyber Security Centre, and says it is notifying data protection authorities.
The data taken from the logs, by Fluidkey’s count:
- 38 email addresses and 37 names
- 17 bank account numbers (IBANs)
- 24 postal addresses
- 4 dates of birth and 2 phone numbers
- viewing keys for 54 newly registered accounts
A viewing key shows an account’s addresses, balances and history. It cannot move funds, Fluidkey says.
For a wallet built so that payments cannot be linked to a person, that last item matters.
What has changed?
Timeline (UTC)
- 5 Nov: first probes of the SigNoz endpoints, which return no log content, per Fluidkey.
- 12-19 Nov: the attacker reads internal logs.
- 19 Nov, 17:28: first unauthorised transfer.
- 17:43: support gets its first report from a user.
- 18:05: transaction processing fully offline.
- 18:12: emergency ticket opened with SEAL 911.
- 20 Nov, 15:27: Fluidkey back online with version 1.79.22.
- 22 Nov, 01:48: post-mortem published.
Before reopening, Fluidkey says it ended every logged-in session, updated SigNoz and took its query interface off the public internet, and stopped writing session tokens and sensitive data to logs.
Its servers now accept a transfer request only if it is authorised with the user’s own key, it says, and changes to two-factor limits are checked on the server.
It also says it is reviewing every third-party and self-hosted tool it runs. The investigation is still open.
We first reported the shutdown in our first report on Thursday. A week earlier, Proxima’s post-mortem also traced a loss back to what had been written into logs.
How many other wallets are logging more than they think?
Protect yourself
- If you use Fluidkey, check the app and your email for a direct message from the company. It says it has contacted every affected user.
- Fluidkey ended all sessions before reopening. If you are asked to log in again, do it in the app itself, not through a link.
- If your IBAN or address was in the logs, expect targeted phishing that quotes those details back to you.
- Ignore anyone offering to “recover” funds by message. Read what a private key is for why the key was not the weak point here.
Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]
This article is for information only and is not investment advice.
