SECURITY ALERT

Stealth addresses hide who you are.

They do not stop someone else from signing.

Fluidkey, a self-custodial wallet that uses stealth addresses to keep users’ payments from being publicly linked, has told users not to use its website or app while it investigates a security incident, the company said on X at 18:20 UTC on Thursday, 19 Nov.

The Fluidkey security incident appears to have involved funds leaving user accounts. In an update at 20:17 UTC, the company said it is working with SEAL 911, a volunteer emergency response group, “on the investigation and on tracing the funds”.

It has not published a loss figure or a cause.

What Fluidkey has said

“There have been no unauthorized transactions since 18:05 UTC, when we took all services offline,” the update said.

The web app and all of Fluidkey’s APIs “remain paused until our review is complete”, it added, and a full post-mortem will follow.

Fluidkey is run by Fluid Privacy SA of Chiasso, Switzerland, according to its website, which says the wallet has more than 30,000 users.

The Defiant reported that the first notice did not say whether funds had been lost.

So how much left, and from where?

What nobody has confirmed

Users replying to Fluidkey on X said their wallets had been emptied. Some accounts posted their own on-chain tallies.

We have not verified any of those totals, and Fluidkey has not confirmed one. This alert will carry a figure once Fluidkey or an investigator names one with addresses.

The company also has not said whether the problem sat in its app, its servers or something else. The word “self-custodial” means only the user should be able to move the money.

Which is why the cause matters more than usual.

Timeline (UTC, 19 Nov)

  • 18:05: Fluidkey takes all services offline, by its own account.
  • 18:20: First notice: do not interact with the website or app.
  • 20:17: Update: no unauthorised transactions since 18:05; SEAL 911 engaged; post-mortem promised.

Protect yourself

  • Do not open the Fluidkey website or app until the company says it is safe.
  • Take updates only from Fluidkey’s official X account and its in-app support chats, which it named as its channels.
  • Ignore anyone offering to “recover” your funds by message. That is how a second theft starts.
  • If you also use the same recovery phrase or keys elsewhere, treat them as exposed until the post-mortem says otherwise. Our guide to what a private key is explains why.

Self-custody moves the risk. It does not remove it.

When the post-mortem lands, will it describe a bug in the code, or a key that was never quite as private as promised?

Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]

Related: BTCPay Server’s emergency update · the K3 sBOLD vault drain

This article is for information only and is not investment advice.