UPDATED 14:52 UTC, 19 Nov: K3 Capital published a post-mortem on X at 12:39 UTC on 19 Nov, with technical analysis by ChainSecurity. It says attackers took about 3.43 million BOLD between 12:25 and 12:33 UTC on 18 Nov, nearly all the vault’s assets, and that the vault was paused at 13:05 UTC. K3 says the cause was that the vault’s public swap() function could leave the 1inch router with an unused token approval, which attackers used after inflating the share price with donations. K3 counts ten attacker operators and 99 transactions (Bitquery counted 97) and says about 986 ETH went to block builders. It says it has identified eight counterparties holding 894.50 ETH, offers a 15% bounty for returned funds, will collect them in ETH for two weeks and then repay affected depositors case by case through a dedicated portal. Liquity V2 and 1inch were not exploited, K3 says.
SECURITY ALERT
One attacker wrote the code.
A bot ran it faster.
K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault, a savings product that earns interest on Liquity’s BOLD stablecoin, appears to have lost about $3.42 million, everything it held, in eight minutes on Wednesday, 18 Nov, according to an on-chain reconstruction by Bitquery.
Security firm Blockaid raised the alarm on X, putting the loss at about $3.43 million at 12:50 UTC and calling the exploit “ongoing”.
K3 Capital replied at 13:08 UTC: “We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused.”
When we checked its account at 10:45 UTC on Thursday, it had posted nothing further.
How the money left
sBOLD is a vault: users deposit BOLD and receive shares whose value tracks the BOLD the vault holds. It parks that BOLD in Liquity V2’s stability pools, which absorb bad loans and receive collateral such as wrapped ether in return.
Bitquery says the attack worked on how the vault priced its shares.
The attacker sent the vault a small amount of wrapped ether that was not counted, deposited, then called the vault’s swap function so the ether became BOLD that did count. The share price rose, and the attacker cashed out at the higher price.
Then did it again.
Blockaid’s first alert said the attackers liquidated their own Liquity loan to push collateral into the pools. Bitquery says it read every loan event during the drain and found no liquidation.
An audit by ChainSecurity flagged a related pricing issue and marked it resolved in a later code version. Bitquery says it did not check which version K3 runs.
So if one wallet wrote the attack, who took the money?
Who ended up with it
Bitquery counted 97 drain transactions from six wallets between 12:25:23 and 12:33:35 UTC.
A copycat bot sent 57 of them and pulled out $1.91 million, 56% of the loss. It paid most of that to block builders to put its transactions first: 12.5 ETH for its first drain, rising to 44 ETH for one block.
Builders received $1.78 million in all, Bitquery says, adding that it has no sign they knew what the transactions did. CoinDesk notes that figure is income, not confirmed profit.
The wallet that deployed the attack first, and a wallet it funded, kept about $0.52 million. Bitquery traced 162 ETH to THORChain with no instructions attached, and a net 129 ETH through Maya Protocol towards five bitcoin addresses.
Liquity said the vault is built and run independently by K3, told users not to deposit, and said Liquity V2 itself is not affected.
What do depositors get back?
What nobody has said
K3 has not published a loss figure, a cause or a plan for depositors.
Bitquery says sBOLD’s yield tokens on Pendle also lost value; it did not measure how much.
Vault contract: 0x50bd66d59911f5e086ec87ae43c811e0d059dd11 (Etherscan)
Protect yourself
- Do not deposit into sBOLD until K3 says otherwise.
- If you hold sBOLD or its Pendle tokens, take instructions only from K3’s and Liquity’s official accounts.
- Treat any “refund” or “claim” link sent to you by message as a likely scam.
- Revoke token approvals you no longer need; vaults are a reminder that a contract can fail after you deposit.
For the basics of how these products work, see how DeFi lending works.
Eight minutes. Ninety-seven transactions. The fastest bidder won.
When an exploit becomes a public auction, who is the vault really defended by?
Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]
Related: the Premia vault drain Blockaid flagged · the Binance hacker’s THORChain route
Related: The next evening, Swiss wallet Fluidkey shut its app and website after users were drained
This article is for information only and is not investment advice.
