UPDATED 04:54 UTC, 19 Nov: LUKSO published a post-mortem on 18 Nov. It said an attacker used a security hole in the backend of its email-based recovery service, overnight from 17 to 18 Nov, to take control of the service’s ‘recovery’ profiles and add their own key to about 300 Universal Profiles, taking around 1.4 million LYX. The LYX was bridged to Ethereum and swapped for about 50 ETH, roughly $95,000, LUKSO said. The email recovery service is switched off and being retired, no private keys or recovery phrases leaked, and LUKSO says it is working on a way to reimburse affected users. Its revised steps: remove the attacker’s key first, then remove the ‘recovery-UP’ controller or its ‘Add Permission’ permission, then make a file backup. The Etherscan section below is unchanged.

SECURITY ALERT

Not a password.

A key you cannot see.

LUKSO said on Wednesday that an attacker used a malicious “recovery” profile to add their own controller key to some Universal Profiles, and that switching off that key’s permissions is not enough to lock the attacker out.

“Removing permissions is NOT enough. You must remove both controllers completely,” the network wrote on X at 07:26 UTC, under the heading “URGENT: Universal Profile security alert”.

Etherscan, separately, said it had detected attempts to get into its customer support system.

What LUKSO has said

A Universal Profile is LUKSO’s smart-contract account. Its “controllers” are the keys allowed to act for it, each with its own permissions, LUKSO’s support pages explain.

The same page says the browser extension can switch a controller’s permissions off, but cannot remove the controller itself. A switched-off controller stays in the list, marked “No control”.

That is the gap the alert is about.

According to TechFlow’s report of the full alert, LUKSO tells holders to remove the attacker’s key first, even if it is not shown in the controller list, and then to remove the malicious controller called “recovery-up”. TechFlow says LUKSO is still investigating and will post updates from its official accounts.

We read only the first lines of LUKSO’s post ourselves, so the order of steps comes from TechFlow and The Defiant.

How did a key get onto a profile without its owner adding it?

What nobody has said

LUKSO has not said how the recovery profile was used, which profiles are affected, or whether any funds have been taken.

TechFlow, citing The Defiant, says a query of LUKSO’s mainnet indexer found 278 profiles that had given the key non-zero permissions at about 07:31 UTC. That is a count of profiles carrying the key. It is not a count of victims or of money lost, and we have not reproduced it.

We found no further statement from LUKSO on losses by 10:50 UTC.

Is a profile that still lists the key safe just because the key looks switched off?

The same morning: Etherscan

Etherscan said on X at 09:20 UTC that it had detected “attempts to gain unauthorized access” to its customer support and ticketing system, which runs on Freshworks, earlier on Wednesday.

It said it was investigating and taking precautions, and told users never to share private keys, seed phrases or passwords with anyone claiming to be its support. “Etherscan Support will never ask for your private keys or recovery phrases,” it wrote.

The notice does not say the attempts succeeded, and it does not say any user data was taken. It says Etherscan “will provide further updates if necessary”.

Nothing links the two incidents, and we have not seen anyone claim they are related.

The record so far

  • 18 Nov, early. Etherscan detects the access attempts, per its notice.
  • 18 Nov, 07:26 UTC. LUKSO posts its alert.
  • 18 Nov, 07:31 UTC. The Defiant’s indexer query counts 278 profiles carrying the key, as TechFlow reports it.
  • 18 Nov, 09:20 UTC. Etherscan posts its notice.

Protect yourself

  • If you use a Universal Profile, open its controller list in the extension and look for a controller you did not add, including one labelled “recovery-up”. Follow LUKSO’s own steps from its official X account, not from a link in a message.
  • Switching permissions off is not removal. LUKSO says the attacker’s key has to be removed completely.
  • Treat any support message that asks for a recovery phrase as a scam, whichever company it claims to come from. See why the recovery phrase is the master key.
  • Do not click links in unexpected “support” emails or tickets that mention Etherscan or LUKSO this week.

One key, hidden from the list. One support desk, probed.

If the screen does not show every key that can move your money, how would you know it was safe?

Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]

Related: the Ledger implant reports from Dubai

Related: BTCPay Server released an emergency update for five nginx flaws the same evening

This article is for information only and is not investment advice.