Bloom trading bot drained of 9,408 SOL from nine users

SECURITY ALERT

The keys stayed put.

The money did not.

Bloom, a trading bot for Solana tokens, says an attacker drained about 9,408 SOL, roughly $947,000, from 49 wallet addresses belonging to nine of its users on Monday.

In a formal statement on X at 09:12 UTC, Bloom blamed a third-party module, which it says was exploited through “a complex Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability”.

It says no private keys were accessed and it has ruled out wider exposure of users’ wallets. It promises to reimburse all of the stolen funds.

What happened, in UTC

About 01:40. On-chain watchers on X begin flagging SOL leaving Bloom users’ wallets.
04:37 to 05:48. In replies on X, Bloom says nine users are affected.
09:12. Formal statement: 49 addresses, nine users, about 9,408 SOL. All Bloom systems go offline as a precaution.
12:41. Bloom addresses the attacker directly, offering confidential talks.

So whose numbers should you trust?

Estimated, reported, confirmed

Researchers counted first.

The analyst Darkfost estimated about $959,000 taken from 41 addresses, counting only those that lost at least 1 SOL. The account KRinweb3 tallied 65 transfers from 53 addresses, totalling 9,408.23 SOL.

Bloom’s own figure is 49 addresses. Some early reports spoke of 49 victims. Bloom says those addresses belong to nine people.

The SOL total now matches across sources. The address count does not, because researchers drew the line at different sizes.

Refunds are promised, not yet paid. Bloom says it will send 100% of the stolen funds to secure wallets that each affected user designates. It is also trying to trace the funds, explore freezing options and identify the attacker.

How do funds leave a wallet if the keys were never touched?

The open question

Bloom has not explained that yet.

Trading bots of this kind hold signing power so they can buy and sell for users in seconds. If code inside the bot can be made to run an attacker’s commands, it may be able to send transactions without anyone ever reading the key itself. That is a general risk of the model, not a finding about Bloom.

The same pattern hit developers this month, when the Railway breach, where keys stored in app secrets were drained showed that a key is only as safe as the service holding it.

Bloom’s 12:41 post went further. It says it has collected “substantial technical evidence, including IP addresses, data centers used”. It offers to negotiate a partial return “in exchange for refraining from legal action within our control”.

By 15:00 UTC, Bloom had not announced any return of funds or a restart of its systems.

What should Bloom users do before the service comes back?

Protect yourself

Do not reconnect until Bloom announces through its official channels that systems are restored. It says every user will then have to log in again to Bloom Manager and the Chrome extension.
Expect fake “refund” and “re-verification” links. Bloom says refunds go to wallets that affected users designate, so treat any unsolicited link with suspicion.
Keep only trading money in any bot wallet. Move longer-term holdings to a wallet whose keys only you control. Our guide to what a private key is explains the difference.
Review which browser extensions can see your trading sessions, and remove the ones you no longer use.

If speed requires a bot to hold the power to sign, who is really holding your wallet?

Corrections and new evidence: [email protected]

This article is for information only and is not investment advice.